Laissez-faire is for the very strong or (imposed upon) the very weak. Countries which successfully change the structure of comparative advantage and their place in the international division of labour (the NICs) are in between (Hettne, 1993, p. 217).
This article contains an examination of whether free trade coupled with the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus has been turned into a defensive strategy used by developed countries in order to maintain and perpetuate the division of labour in the global market between developed and developing countries. The question is raised of whether developed countries are worried that some highly populated emerging economies may follow the path of the newly industrialized economies. As a pre-emptive measure, developed countries adopt free trade as a defensive mechanism that would create a level playing field or "fair trade" in the global market and would deliberately stifle infant, high value added industries from thriving within emerging economies. On a level playing field, infant industries cannot compete against the wellestablished corporations of developed countries. Finally, free trade also leads to another indirect outcome: it intensifies competition among developing economies in low value added goods and consequently lessens a rise in the income of unskilled labour in these economies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Does openness to free trade promote economic growth in developing countries or does it perpetuate the division of labour between the South and the North? This paper revisits the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theorem and neoliberal economic theory. It contains an examination of whether the well thoughtout policy of neoliberalism and openness to free trade is deliberately employed as a defensive strategy by developed countries for the purpose of perpetuating the division of labour between developing and developed countries -the former specializes in low valued added, labour-intensive goods, while the latter specializes in high value added, capital-intensive goods. Developed countries, in general, are concerned that some highly populated emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia, may follow in the footsteps of the Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs), such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. Developed countries fear that, through the adoption of the Asian development model (ADM) of State-led development and export-oriented strategy, such emerging economies will manage to construct their comparative advantage in high value added products, thus encroaching on developed countries' market share in these goods. In the words of Park (2002, pp. 330-331) in reference to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China:
[They] are known to have followed the [East Asian] model for their successful economic development efforts. This model of state-directed capitalism seemed to combine the dynamic aspects of a market-oriented economy with the advantages of centralized government planning and direction. The model has been credited for transforming East Asian countries into an export powerhouse and for producing spectacular economic growth.
In the present article, time series cross-national data of 180 countries from 1970 to 2009 are used, and it contains an examination of the impact of free trade between developing and developed countries on growth in GDP per capita. Rather than adopting the terminology of the conventional dependency theory of "offensive free trade" policy (author's term), in which it is claimed that developed countries establish free trade with developing countries in order to deliberately exploit the latter's natural resources or abundant labour (Brewer, 1990, p. 163) , in this article the issue of whether developed countries as a whole apply a "defensive free trade" strategy that is aimed at depriving the developing countries, in general, and emerging economies, in particular, of being able to specialize in desirable industries. By definition, a desirable industry has a high value added per worker, utilizes advance technology in the production process and pays high wages (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000, p. 217) .
The article pursues a State-centric approach to international trade and assumes that States continue to compete over market share in high value added goods in particular. In other words, the article examines whether the very construction of free trade among countries is aimed at creating a level playing field, where firms would compete on an equal footing in the global market. By definition, free trade means that States under a free trade regime agree on a reciprocal policy of lowering their tariffs to a minimum agreed level, removing agreed non-tariff barriers to trade and specifying the exact role of the Government in the market. Likewise, a level playing field is aimed at separating States from markets and preventing Governments from applying ADM measures. Developed countries are confident that on a level playing field their giant corporations can outperform the infant, high value added industries of emerging economies not only in the global market but also in the local market of these economies as well. In other words, by dissociating Governments from markets, emerging economies will find it extremely difficult to construct their comparative advantage in desirable industries. In this sense, free trade is not a passive, neutral process that takes the division of labour between countries as given, but it is an active mechanism that is aimed at halting the encroachment by emerging economies on developed countries' market shares in high value added goods. Under a regime of both free trade and a sheer separation between States and markets, developing countries would reluctantly accept the comparative advantage ascribed to them by the market forces and thus would be doomed to produce low value added, labour-intensive goods.
II. THEORETICAL REVIEW: STATES AND MARKETS
Can Governments construct their comparative advantage through State-led development and export-oriented strategies? Can Governments choose to specialize in high value added goods and shape their export basket in these goods? In his seminal book, Alfred Marshall (1890) argued that a firm can enjoy positive external economies by locating its factory close to other firms that produce the same or similar products, since it can have access, at low or no cost, to skilled labour, as well as exchange inputs, expertise and information. This Marshall-positive externality could be manifested in increasing returns to scale, knowledge creation and transfer through an agglomeration process (Paci and Usai, 1999, p. 382; Krugman, 1993) . By the same token, Governments may choose to invest in selected desirable industries, cluster factories in one area, provide them with subsidies, protection, grants and lines of credit at low interest rates and offer training to workers that would be oriented towards those industries. This endogenous growth model emphasizes factors, such as technology, knowledge spillovers and learning-by-doing, that lead to a specialization in high value added goods. Yet, this process is less relevant in sectors of low value added goods. Further, the presence of increasing returns to scale in high value added sectors may set in motion a process of sustained endogenous growth, where a high rate of productivity leads to greater incentives for investment and technological innovations. Gerschenkron (1962) , the economic historian, asserted that the later industrialization begins, the more government intervention becomes essential, because over time production methods become more capital intensive. Under these conditions, Governments are required to finance industrialization, because capitalists either do not want to or do not have finance to do so.
The question is do these policies suffice to enable Governments to construct their comparative advantage in high value added goods? What is certain though is that classical and neoclassical theorists of free trade, such as David Ricado and Eli Heckscher, respectively, take the comparative advantage of countries as given and thus implicitly assume that market forces do not provide a country with the ability to construct its comparative advantage. Yet, if the magnitude of a positive externality is relatively higher in developing countries than in developed countries, the former may reap high rents from specializing in the production of desirable goods. Some Governments in East Asia have recognized the limitations of free markets in the allocation of scarce resources in the economy or in forging a national comparative advantage in desirable industries. These Governments mistrusted the market logic and instead have used government intervention to promote economic development. ADM combines dynamic elements of a decentralized market-oriented economy, export-oriented strategy and protectionism with the advantages of centralized government planning. Such Governments have constructed a meritocratic bureaucracy that steered the economy and cooperated closely with the private sector, promoted universal education, invested in human capital, adopted policies of State-led development and export-oriented strategy, manipulated (undervalued) their exchange rate in order to boost exports, limited imports of competing goods, foreign direct investment (FDI) directed towards export-oriented sectors and grants and loans allocated to desirable industries at low interest rates and favourable foreign exchange rates (Evans, 1995, p. 37; Woo-Cumings, 1998, p. 322) . The role of the bureaucracy in the Republic of Korea, for instance, has been to construct the national comparative advantage in desirable industries and to guide production and exports (Park, 2002, p. 339) .
Such East Asian Governments pursued a policy of "moral hazard" in which private companies reaped the benefits of a successful investment in their industry, whereas the Government bore the costs of unsuccessful ones. In other words, the Government provided a safety net for hesitant capitalists. In the present article, it is argued that, based on the experience of Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, the adoption of ADM by a new group of developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia, may enable them to escape the traditional international division of labour between developed countries and developing countries (for a critique of this argument, see Krugman, 1994a; 1994b; and 1994c) . This process may herald a second wave of NIEs, while developed countries seek to prevent this outcome from materializing. In this sense, neoliberal free traders in the North are not indifferent to the domestic development strategies of developing countries. The consequences of a second wave of NIEs will have more far-reaching consequences on living standards in developed countries than the first wave, due to the fact that the new wave will comprise highly populated countries. In the words of Wang and Wei (2008, p. 1 
):
Chinese exports have become increasingly sophisticated. This has generated anxiety in developed countries as competitive pressure may increasingly be felt outside labor-intensive industries.... Somewhat surprisingly, neither processing trade nor foreign invested firms are found to play an important role in generating the increased overlap between China's export structure and that of high-income countries. Instead, improvement in human capital and government policies in the form of tax-favored high-tech zones appear to be the key to the country's evolving export structure.
The HOS theorem, by contrast, is a static model of international trade in which it is assumed that the abundant factor of production, whether it is labour or capital, will experience an increase in income, due to a burgeoning demand for its production by foreign markets, whereas the income of the scarce factor will experience a decline (Harkness, 1978, p. 786; Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas, 1987, p. 791) . The rise in income will continue up to the level of factor price equalization, at which the income per factor of production between two trading partners, for instance a developed and a developing country, levels out (Kapstein, 2000, p. 365) . At any rate, consumers, according to this neoclassical theory, will enjoy higher living standards under free trade than under protectionism, as they will have access to imported goods at lower prices and/or of better quality. Further, under this theory the trade performance of a country tends to be a reliable indicator of its overall economic performance which is manifested in relatively high GDP growth. In sum, under the HOS theorem it is asserted that every partial step towards more openness to free trade offers the possibility of overall economic growth whereas, in general, free trade is better than protectionism. With the HOS theorem, the existence of two countries (a developed and a developing country), two goods (labour-and capitalintensive ones) and two factors of production (labour and capital) is assumed. Moreover, it is also assumed that the transfer of technology is limited across borders (Sachs and others, 1994) .
The HOS theorem has a few shortcomings. First, the plethora of developing countries competing between themselves in labour-intensive goods will cause merely a slight rise in the wages for unskilled labour. Second, the transfer of technology and the free movement of capital across borders is not restricted under the current free trade regime, where capital would move to an area in which the return on investments is the highest. The free movement of capital will increase productivity of unskilled workers in the South, yet it may not necessarily increase their wages, as multinational corporations will capture these rents of production. Third, the increasing demand for non-tradable goods, especially within developed countries, for such workers as barbers, waiters and taxi drivers raises the demand for local unskilled labour and prevents a drop in their wages despite free trade, thus preventing the process of factor price equalization from materializing. Fourth, NIEs demonstrated that the comparative advantage of an economy is not given by the relative endowments of its factors of production. As Wood (2007, p. 4 
) put it:
The main empirical difficulty is that capital is internationally mobile: machines are traded, buildings can be put up anywhere in a year or two, and finance flows around the world on a massive scale. This mobility matters because -as is clear intuitively... But as a first empirical approximation it is reasonable to suppose that, as a result of mobility of both capital goods and finance, there is little variation among countries in the 'rental' rate of capital (the real interest rate times the price of capital goods). And in capital theory it is a country's rental rate that determines how cheaply it can produce capital-intensive goods, defined as those with high capital-output ratios.
Moreover, many scholars have used the HOS theorem to examine how free trade has caused wages of unskilled workers to fall in developed countries based on the factor price equalization theorem (Sachs and others, 1994; Wood, 1994) . The HOS model indeed explains the wage decline of unskilled workers in developed countries. Yet, has trade really led to a significant increase in the wages of unskilled workers in developing countries, let alone to a convergence in the factor prices between developed and developing countries? In short, the factor price equalization theorem is far from reflecting the outcome of North-South trade.
Contrary to the assumption of factor price equalization under the HOS theorem, free trade has intensified competition among developing countries in labourintensive manufacturing products and consequently has prevented a major upsurge in unskilled labour income (Hale and Long, 2011, p. 405) . On one hand, free trade has increased the demand for unskilled workers in developing countries and put upward pressure on their wages, as predicted by the HOS theorem. On the other, the intense competition among these countries and the feminization of the labour market within them have put downward pressure on wages (Standing, 1989; Greider, 2000) .
Developing countries that open up their economies to free trade encounter fierce competition from other overpopulated developing countries; thus, the income of unskilled labour would even out at a very low level when comparing the situation in developing countries. In short, while it is possible that free trade has caused a rise in the wages of unskilled workers in developing countries, this rise did not bring about factor price equalization among unskilled workers in developing and developed countries.
The problem with the assumptions in the HOS theorem is that it examines how the transformation from autarky to free trade affects the factors of production in a world comprising only two States. The HOS theorem belongs to a family of theories of comparative advantage that stresses relativity, thus comparing the abundance of factors of production across countries (Wood, 1994; Schott, 2003; Wood, 2007) . Under the HOS theorem, it is suggested that workers benefit or lose from changes in trade policy given their country's relative endowments of the factors of production (capital or labour). In addition, a higher wage per worker represents a higher average capital-labour ratio. This is based on the assumption that industries that are capital intensive tend to have a relatively higher productivity per worker, which is translated into a higher income. Capital-intensive countries, however, tend to have a wide range of differentiated products, thus enabling them to experience a high volume of intra-industry trade, a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the HOS theorem. By the same token, developing countries tend to have a narrow range of differentiated products as they tend to export fewer products.
Finally, the Washington Consensus (between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and United States Department of the Treasury), which draws on the theory of neoliberalism, emphasizes the importance of competitive markets that operate freely under the invisible hand of market forces. The consensus is a prescriptive measure of liberalization, privatization, deregulation and contraction of the scope of government activity in the economy. Under the model, a clear separation between States and markets is called for, where the Government's role is confined to establishing rules and regulations and then entrepreneurs are allowed to pursue their own interests freely. The consensus prescribes a fiscal discipline (a very low budget deficit enforced by law), redirection of public spending towards public goods, comprehensive tax reforms, interest rate liberalization in conjunction with trade and financial liberalization, a floating exchange rate, capital account liberalization, privatization and deregulation (Williamson, 1990; Serra and Stiglitz, 2008, chap. 2; Gore, 2000, p. 789 ; for a critique of this approach, see Stiglitz, 2002) . Implementing these measures would ward off attempts by developing countries to duplicate the experience of NIEs.
Many economists perceive neoliberalism as an objective economic theory in which the main interest is the efficient allocation of resources. In fact, this is a political-economic theory in which there is interest in the distribution of wealth between and within countries. In this article, it is argued that the rationale behind these measures is to separate States from markets and to deprive Governments in developing countries of the ability to use fiscal or monetary tools or to adopt ADM for the sake of constructing their comparative advantage in desirable goods. Many Governments in the developing world, due to their weakness vis-à-vis international institutions, such as IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank, find it extremely difficult to support their industries under free trade. This weakness enables these organizations to impose constraints that are intended to block Governments in developing countries from supporting their economies.
III. NEUTRAL, OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FREE TRADE
There are three types of free trade: neutral, offensive and defensive. Neutral free trade is the type of trade described by the classical Ricardian international trade theory and the HOS theorem. In this version, each State has its own comparative advantage that is given exogenously, where each State exports goods that it could produce more efficiently than others and imports goods that otherwise it would produce at a higher cost than the global price. With regard to neutral free trade, it is assumed that each State focuses on its absolute gains from trade, where a division of labour between States based on their comparative advantage would bring States closer to the Pareto optimal frontier, at which the utility of one actor could not be increased without decreasing the utility of another. In this sense, free trade is a win-win game, where the gains of State A are determined by its pre-given comparative advantage, rather than by the actions of State A or its partner State B.
Thus, the movement from a state of autarky to free trade will certainly, in this view, increase the utility of all the actors engaged in the process. However, the theory is not concerned with the distribution of wealth or the amount of utility each actor reaps from taking part in a free trade regime. The idea behind neutral free trade is summarized in the following passage from Drezner (2006, p. 2):
A free trade orientation believes that trade expansion creates significant benefits for American consumers, the American economy, and American foreign policy, while at the same time offers growth opportunities for the rest of the world. The goal of this orientation, therefore, is to reduce as many barriers to U.S. exports and imports as quickly as possible.
Offensive free trade, however, is the type of trade that could be associated with mercantilism, the dependency theory and the world system theory. Other modern versions of offensive free trade could include the strategic trade model. The common ground among all of these approaches is their focus on relative gains from free trade rather than absolute gains, or how one State could maximize its gains at the expense of other State(s). In mercantilism the primacy of politics is emphasized over economics and it is assumed that States seek to control economic growth in order to accumulate more capital and/or wealth than other States, where more wealth enables a State to expand its tax base that can be used to augment its power.
With regard to strategic trade theory, it is similarly contended that certain countries implement policies that are intended to affect the outcome of strategic interactions between firms in an industry dominated by a small number of firms. Under that theory it is contended that Governments can use trade policy instruments to shift profits from foreign to domestically owned firms, thereby raising national economic welfare at the expense of foreign firms. Such a trade policy can raise the level of domestic wealth of a State. The provision of export subsidies and grants to research and development for firms facing global competition in strategic industries can have a tremendous impact on the prospects for their survival in the international market. If, for instance, State A makes an aggressive commitment to subsidize exports and State B does not react, State B's firm has to reduce its output and State A's firm will obtain a larger market share of sales and profits that over time may render State B's firm bankrupt. In effect, export subsidies can shift oligopoly profits from a foreign firm to a domestic one. Consequently, in State A there is an increase in national income that is expected to exceed its initial outlays on export subsidies and grants.
Similarly, with regard to the dependency/world system theories it is assumed that capitalism is a global structure, where under conditions of free trade rich countries tend to specialize in high value added goods, while poor countries tend to specialize in low value added goods. The division of labour between the two, the perfect competition in low value added goods and the oligopoly that developed countries enjoy in high value added goods lead to an exploitation of developing countries by developed countries through the transfer of surplus capital from the South to the North. In short, offensive free trade is aimed at exploiting other countries through specialization in industries dominated by a small number of firms. With these theories it is assumed that developing countries cannot escape this exploitation, unless they dissociate themselves from the process of free trade and retreat into a regime of import-substitution industrialization.
Under defensive free trade, however, it is contended that a decline in the competitiveness of some developed countries has resulted in their de-industrialization since the mid-1970s. The combination of a rapid international diffusion of advanced technology, cheap labour, State-led development policy and export-oriented strategies by some emerging markets (these countries could also be called semiperipheries) has led to de-industrialization in developed countries and increased competition in high value added goods. De-industrialization results in the expansion of the service sector in which productivity is low, while increasing competition precipitates a decline in the prices of high value added goods making them more affordable to the lower classes. In this sense, the combination of State-led development strategies and export-oriented strategies in emerging economies is blamed for job losses and career insecurity among the working class in developed countries, including among skilled workers. Advances in and the transfer of technology have enabled producers in emerging markets to equip their low-wage workforce with the most modern machinery available and to become highly competitive in consumer electronics, steel, apparel and other consumer goods.
In short, some emerging markets use State institutions as instrumental agencies in order to construct their comparative advantage in high value added goods. Those States have enjoyed access to international technology at low cost, experienced rapid growth in capital formation and improved the skills of their workers. These parameters have enabled producers in emerging economies to outcompete developed country producers in high valued added goods. In order to remedy this process, developed countries have demanded a complete separation between States and markets in the developing world, rendering the model of State-led development as unfair, incompatible with the rules of WTO and inconsistent with the principles of free and fair trade. In addition, developed countries have set strict rules on the use of advanced technology through regulations, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Wade, 2003, pp. 625-627) . Defensive free traders hope to maintain the status quo in the division of labour between developed countries and developing countries by creating a level playing field in the global market. Developed countries are confident that the conduct of free trade on a level playing field in which firms compete on their own under global regulations will perpetuate the upper hand of developed countries over developing countries in desirable industries.
Developed countries are concerned that the rise of densely populated emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia, will create a watershed in the global economy that will cause a deterioration in living standards within developed countries. The fact that NIEs managed to develop by implementing ADM has caused anxiety in developed countries, as some other emerging markets could follow the footsteps of NIEs and erode developed countries' comparative advantage and market share in high valued added goods. In the words of one writer, "the United States will eventually become an economy specializing in farm products and services-'a nation of hamburger stands'" (Lawrence, 1984, p. 2) .
With regard to defensive free trade strategy, it is assumed that, while expansion in unregulated free trade may benefit many United States citizens in the short term, in the long term Americans will experience a decline in their living standards. Defensive free traders believe that unchecked free trade increases job insecurity for workers in high value added sectors and encourages the importation of goods made in States that adopt the State-led development model, which violates the principles of free and fair trade (Hall, 2003) . The goal of this approach is to regulate free trade in order to minimize economic costs. Defensive free traders are not advocating protectionism, but rather the creation of freer markets and a level playing field in the global market that would maintain developed countries' economic leadership in the global market. In this view, any kind of global trade war would severely damage developed countries' economies and leadership. American free traders, for instance, understand that slowing down imports will encourage other countries to erect higher trade barriers against United States exports and that may further erode the comparative advantage of the United States in high value added goods. In the words of one report prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Congress of the United States (Hornbeck and others, 2013, p. 9 
Currently, U.S. trade policy to open markets abroad is conducted at three levels: through bilateral negotiations and trade/investment agreements, through establishing free trade agreements, and through multilateral negotiations under the WTO. Trade policy plays a proactive role in leveling the playing ground for U.S. business, a remedial role in correcting distortions in trade caused by foreign government intervention, and a reactive role in addressing specific problems raised by U.S. businesses.
It is worth mentioning that the negotiations during the Doha round were suspended in July 2006 following a stand-off between developed countries which refused to reduce their farm subsidies and a group of emerging economies which refused to liberalize their industrial and service sectors.
Advocates of defensive free trade believe that, under a free trade regime, the infant industries of the emerging economies cannot compete against the giant companies of developed countries. These advocates perceive losses of market share in high value added goods as a zero-sum game: an expansion in the market share of emerging economies in high value added goods is equal to the losses of developed countries. In this view, competitiveness in high value added goods and competition over a market share is similar to a war over territories between States. These advocates conceive "pure" free trade under global regulations as the best mechanism against an encroachment on developed countries' market share in high value added goods. By the same token, a retreat into protectionism is not an option for these advocates (Krugman, 1994a) .
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The assumption that this section examines is: if rich countries specialize in "rich-country" products, while developing countries are doomed to produce "poor-country" goods (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007, p. 2) and, if developing countries compete between themselves in low value added goods in the global market, then we should witness a weak correlation between openness to free trade and growth in GDP per capita. In order to investigate this assumption, the author relied on data on 180 countries (developed as well as developing) from 1970 to 2009. The data are taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank.
Hypotheses

H1: If a free trade regime creates a level playing field between countries, then free trade also perpetuates the division of labour between developed and developing countries that are members of that regime and consequently maintains the disparity in income per capita between them.
The creation of a level playing field in the global market is aimed at thwarting the attempts of developing countries in supporting desirable infant industries. The only new industries that developing countries would be able to establish are ones that manufacture standardized products that have reached the last stage of their life cycle and usually pay low wages. The production of standardized products is transferred to the South usually by multinational corporations. In this sense, a level playing field in the global market perpetuates the conventional division of labour between the developed countries and developing countries. The explicit assumption of the neoliberal theory is that high value added goods/services are non-standardized products that utilize advanced technology and skilled labour in the production process. Further, low competition in these goods/services would enable companies specializing in them to reap high earnings. In other words, low competition in some high value added goods/services is not determined by the market conditions, but is constructed by developed countries under a free trade regime by barring emerging economies from specializing in these goods.
H2: If free trade intensifies competition among developing countries in low value added goods/services, then free trade has a limited impact on the rise in income per capita in developing countries.
The internationalization of production and free trade creates fierce competition in labour-intensive industries in developing countries. While free trade has a positive impact on the wages of unskilled labourers in developing countries and lowers the income of their counterparts in developed countries, free trade also has intensified competition among developing countries in labour-intensive goods/ services.
In table 1 it may be observed that trade as a percentage of GDP explains only 1 per cent of changes in annual growth in GDP per capita. Thus, while the link between the two variables is positive and significant, the correlation between them is weak, as R stands at 0.093. The weak correlation is also demonstrated clearly in figure 1. There are several opposite factors that link trade to growth in per capita income. On one hand, imports of capital increase the ratio of capital to labour in developing countries (as shown in figure 2 ) and augment workers' productivity; in addition, the burgeoning demand for goods in the global market raises the demand for workers in developing countries. These factors should have a positive impact on growth in income per capita. On the other, the abundance of unskilled workers in developing countries, the feminization of the labour market in developing countries and the race to the bottom (when States with similar factor endowments compete between themselves to provide multinational corporations with the best conditions) put downward pressure on wages (Rudra, 2008, p. 3; Greider, 2000; Standing, 1989) . These findings show that free trade has a weak impact on GDP per capita growth and consequently does not lead to factor price equalization between developed and developing countries, as predicted by the HOS theorem. 
Confidence interval and prediction interval
Model 2 shows a positive and significant correlation (at the 95 per cent confidence interval) between the independent variable (annual growth in imports of goods and services) and the dependent one (annual growth in GDP per capita). An increase in the independent variable of 1 per cent causes a 0.14 per cent increase in the dependent variable, yet the former explains only 16 per cent of the change in the latter. Neoliberal economists argue that free trade affects economic growth through imports. Developing countries import advanced technology and incorporate it in local factories that increase the ratio of capital to labour and consequently raise worker productivity. This is certainly true, but if many developing countries saturate the global market in low value added goods, then the prices of these goods must go down and the terms of trade of developing countries, as a whole, would deteriorate as a result. Further, this correlation could be misleading to a certain extent, because the regression examines overall imports without taking into account that some countries restrict importing goods/services that compete against locally made ones. These countries fear that unrestricted importation may put some industries out of business, or may eliminate infant industries before they mature.
In short, tables 1 and 2 show a weak link between trade and imports, on one hand, and GDP per capita growth, on the other. Table 1 in particular shows that, in contrast to the assumption under the HOS theorem, trade did not cause a major hike in GDP per capita growth and did not bring about factor price equalization. Models 3 to 6 in tables 3a and 3b show a positive correlation between the four independent variables and the dependent variable. Yet, it seems that, while indicator R falls within the range between .459 and .549 (which indicates a fair correlation), the dependent variable is affected mainly by the annual growth in manufacturing value added, which has the highest beta coefficient (.397) among all four predictors. This means that a 1 per cent change in the latter will produce an almost 0.4 per cent change in growth in GDP per capita. All in all, the four variables explain only 30 per cent of the change in the dependent variable. Manufacturing value added can certainly be affected by exports and imports. Exports of manufactured goods could boost manufacturing value added through scale economies and put pressure on the industry to meet international standards, while imports increase the ratio of capital to labour in this sector. Table 4 shows the ratios between several variables of selected developed countries and developing countries in four selected years from 1980 to 2009. 1 These developing countries were selected because they meet the criteria of highly populated countries and emerging economies; some of them have adopted an orthodox neoliberal model under the auspices of IMF (Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico), while others pursued an unorthodox model (China and India). The variables include the percentage of trade to GDP, current GDP per capita, GDP per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Table 6 shows the correlation between the variables over 30 consecutive years from 1980 to 2009 (no selection of years).
It should be noted that Brazil and Mexico started to implement their structural adjustment programme and openness to free trade in 1983. These countries suffered from high inflation rates coupled with the effects of the debt crisis during the 1980s. The structural adjustment programme included restructuring their external debt, floating the exchange rate, removing barriers to foreign investment, privatization of domestic banks and trade liberalization (Boughton, 2001, p. 361) . Since the late 1980s, these countries implemented a further reduction in the role of the Government in the economy and greater integration into the global economy. Table 4 shows that, despite the fact that Mexico's trade and export as a percentage of GDP had increased relative to those of the United States from 1980 to 2009, the ratio of purchasing power parity GDP per capita between Mexico and the United States went up. In short, Brazil and Mexico were unsuccessful in increasing their own These ratios were examined from the beginning of 1980 because prior to that year China was almost isolated from the West, and following the debt crisis in the 1980s, IMF started to restructure the economies of many the third world countries. income per capita relative to that of developed countries. Indonesia started the IMF stabilization and adjustment programme in 1998 following the Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997 and scored a significant increase in its income per capita relative to that of developed countries. China and India have recorded a sharp upsurge in their income per capita relative to developed countries (table 4). These two giant States have never implemented a structural adjustment programme under IMF auspices, and their Governments have continued to steer their economies in parallel towards a gradual openness to international trade. Their exports are diversified geographically and in terms of the type of their exported products. China in particular has pursued an unorthodox economic policy of gradual reform strategy, undervalued exchange rate and export orientation (Zheng, Bigsten and Hu, 2009, p. 874) . Despite or because of this policy, these two countries have been successful in raising their PPP GDP per capita relative to that of some developed countries.
In model 7 (tables 7a and 7b) the correlation between both annual growth in exports and imports, the percentage of trade to GDP and GDP per person employed are examined. Through this model, there is an effort to neutralize the impact of demographic growth on income per capita and concentration on how international trade affects worker productivity. The model shows that, while the coefficient "annual growth in imports of goods and services" is insignificant, the coefficient of "annual growth in exports of goods and services" has a small but negative correlation with the dependent variable: "GDP per person employed, constant". All in all, the three variables in the model can explain only less than 7 per cent of changes in the dependent variable, as R stands at 0.265, which implies a weak correlation between the independent variables and the dependent one. In sum, these findings indicate that there is no evidence that free trade brings about factor price equalization between developed and developing countries or that free trade leads to a major improvement in income per capita in developing countries. What is clear from this research is that, first, annual growth in both imports and manufacturing has a limited positive impact on growth in GDP per capita; and second, Governments that have steered their economies and pursued unorthodox economic policy in parallel with regulating their openness to free trade have performed much better in terms of narrowing the income disparity between them and developed countries than emerging economies that adopted an orthodox neoliberal model.
V. DEVELOPMENT AND FREE TRADE
Globalization and the institutionalization of free trade both at the national and international levels have brought some to announce the "end of the third world", while the new world "does not lend itself to the simple identification of First and Third, haves and have-nots, rich and poor, industrial and non-industrialized.... The process of dispersal of manufacturing capacity brings enormous hope to areas where poverty has hitherto appeared immovable" (Harris, 1986, pp. 200-202) . The structural divide between the South and the North, the claim continues, is becoming irrelevant in the epoch of globalization, as each developing country has the opportunity to restructure its economy and raise its overall national living standards through free trade and integration in the global market. "This consensus is consistent with the earlier expectation that decolonization and Third World industrialization would substantially reduce the North-South income divide" (Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2007, p. 321) .
Other scholars even went one step further claiming that industrialization and rising income per capita in the South would lead to a gradual de-industrialization and decreasing income per capita in the North (Wood, 1994, pp. 72-74) . In this view, the "innocent" process of free trade between the North and the South disadvantages the former, even though the South cannot employ structural power over the North. This pattern, the argument continues, of a decrease and increase in income per capita in the North and the South, respectively, is due to a higher ratio of capital to labour and consequently productivity in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector. As developed countries abandon industrialization and shift to the service sector, while industrialization is outsourced to developing countries, the latter experience higher productivity than the North and an upsurge in their income per capita. Some scholars have asserted that de-industrialization is a direct consequence of trade with developing countries (Sachs and others, 1994, p. 13; Wood, 1994, p. 87) . By tying the rate of employment in the manufacturing sector to imports from developing countries, Wood demonstrated how an increase in trade caused de-industrialization in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Manufactured products that are imported from developing countries are labourintensive and thus encroach on the competitiveness of labour-intensive industries in OECD countries (Wood, 1994, pp. 121-126) . As a result, unemployment among unskilled workers increases and their wages shrink. In the same vein, Sachs and others (1994, p. 16 ) demonstrated that an increase in international trade is the prime reason behind de-industrialization in the United States. They argued that imports of labour intensive goods from developing countries force companies to lay off unskilled workers within the United States.
Likewise, some scholars apply the product cycle theory to the North-South divide, assuming that the more products become standardized with little prospect for further innovation (for example, plastic products, tyres, shoes and bicycles), the more these products are outsourced to the South, thereby expanding the range of goods produced in the South (Dollar, 1986) . As this range expands, the South improves its terms of trade and raises its living standards relative to the North.
Empirically speaking, contemporary researchers have been concerned about quantifying the effects of free trade with the South on wages and employment in the North. It is widely accepted among these scholars that the wages of unskilled workers in developed countries relative to their counterparts in developing countries have been falling since the late 1970s. In the words of Blank (2009, p. 16): 2 As has been widely noted, substantial wage losses for less-skilled men occurred after 1979. Among those with post-high school education, wages rose slightly from 1979 to 1994 (there were much larger increases among men with a college education). Since the early 1990s, wages have risen at all skill levels. By 2007, full-time weekly wages were $439 for high school dropouts, $619 for high school graduates, and $934 for those with more than a high school degree. For the two less-educated groups, these levels are still well below where they were in 1979, however.
In examining the relationship between openness and growth, Dollar (1992, p. 524) , a neoliberal economist, asserted that the more an economy is outwardoriented, the higher would be its growth rate. He created an "index of real exchange rate distortion" and an "index of real exchange rate variability" that could be used in an attempt to measure openness based on purchasing power parity and relative prices. Distortions are calculated as the difference between the actual price level of an identical basket of consumption goods and the predicted values from a regression model of the price level. In other words, in turning the United States into a yardstick country, the data provided estimates of each country's price level relative to that of the United States. This represents a measurement of a protectionist policy of an economy in terms of the degree to which the domestic currency is under/overvalued. The lower are the distortion and the variation, the lower is the value of Dollar's protectionism index, thus the more the economy is an outward-oriented one. Dollar found an inverse relationship between this index of protectionism and economic growth for a cross section of 95 developing countries, implying that the more open an economy is, the faster it grows over time. He stated: "the index derived here measures the extent to which the real exchange rate is distorted away from its free-trade level by the trade regime, [and] a country sustaining a high price level over many years would clearly have to be a country with a relatively large amount of protection" (Dollar, 1992, p. 524) .
It would be premature to assert, however, that openness to free trade is systematically associated with higher income per capita or boosts development in developing countries -bearing in mind that GDP growth and development are not two sides of the same coin. Openness to free trade may have two contradictory effects on income per capita in developing countries. First, the burgeoning demands for labour-intensive goods will increase the demand for labour and will have a positive effect on wages. Yet, competition against other developing countries will have an opposite effect on wages of unskilled workers. Furthermore, the fact that developing countries experience economic growth under openness to free trade does not mean that developing countries are catching up with developed countries in high value added goods. The majority of developing countries have joined WTO and have become obliged to take required measures that are aimed at opening their economies to trade -creating free and "fair" trade in the global market. Developed countries use their economic clout in order to create a level playing field in global trade, in which developing countries forfeit their right and authority of constructing their comparative advantage in desirable goods.
Free trade has created competition on a level playing field between two "unequal teams", as developing countries would remain passive absorbers of industries outsourced to them by multinational corporations. These countries would produce standardized products in large quantities. On a level playing field, the forces of free trade would prevent shrinking the disparity in income per capita between developed countries and developing countries. Developed countries are ready to sacrifice the interests of their unskilled labourers engaged in the production of labourintensive goods for the sake of saving the interests of skilled labourers. Thus, free trade would kill two birds with one stone: the importing of cheap goods from developing countries while retaining the production of capital-intensive goods within developed countries.
In this regard, some have asserted that "strong North-South industrial convergence has been associated with virtually no convergence in total value added per capita" (Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2003, p. 40 , emphasis in the original; for a critique of their paper, see Amsden, 2003) . To put it simply, North-South industrial convergence has not been associated with North-South income convergence. In the view of Arrighi, Silve and Brewer (2003, p. 40 ):
[T]he non-convergence we observe does have something to do with manufacturing, because even within manufacturing, strong North-South industrial convergence has been associated with a considerably weaker income convergence. Nevertheless, the non-convergence we observe has indeed primarily to do, not just with differences in the growth rates of the service and agricultural sectors of North and South, but also with differences in the overall growth of manufacturing relative to other activities....the share of MVA [manufacturing value added] in total value added for the world as a whole has declined from 28 per cent in 1960 to 24.5 per cent in 1980 to 20.5 per cent in 1998. ... The South has thus been catching up with the North in a declining sphere of economic activity.
Alice Amsden has argued that United States policy towards developing countries has shifted from being indifferent about the method of internal development strategy to making an effort to impose a uniform set of development choices through neoliberalism that is aimed at strangling development. In her view, under the "First American Empire, 1950 Empire, -1980 , developing countries enjoyed an economic golden age. Those that applied their knowledge to promote infant industries through import-substitution and opening up to exports at a later stage, once those industries had matured, managed to develop. Those developing countries -due to their economic and political clout, manufacturing know-how and human capabilities -have been able to escape the influence of the United States (Amsden and Chu, 2003, pp. 10-15) . Under the "Second American Empire" (or neoliberalism) most developing countries entered "hell" (Amsden, 2007, p. 3) . Growth stalled as the United States imposed neoliberalism through IMF and that has destined developing countries to specialize in labour-intensive, low value added goods. Only those "recalcitrant" countries that managed to adopt ADM, such as China, managed to develop, according to Amsden (2007, p. 3):
If the motto of the First Empire was "Get smart," then the motto of the Second Empire was "Get tough." Financial services were becoming the largest single industry in the United States. To spread its wings, Wall Street demanded that the Treasury Department get Third World countries to deregulate their financial markets. No less vocal, multinationals wanted developing countries to practice free trade and drop all investment controls.
The question, however, is not whether there is a relationship between openness and growth, but how much relationship is there? In the words of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001, p. 266 
):
Our bottom line is that the nature of the relationship between trade policy and economic growth remains very much an open question. The issue is far from having been settled on empirical grounds. We are in fact skeptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship between trade openness and growth waiting to be discovered. We suspect that the relationship is a contingent one, dependent on a host of country and external characteristics.
By the same token, little work is available on the effect of openness on development. Some have argued that, whereas openness affects economic growth primarily through exports, openness influences development through imports. Other scholars have emphasized the role of imports and asserted that, if used efficiently, imports of capital as well as technology and new ideas could enhance a country's development capacity (Awokuse, 2007, p. 161 ).
According to Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 151) , the answer to the question "does trade promote innovation in a small open economy" depends on whether the forces of comparative advantage generate long-term growth through externalities in research and development and on expanding the range of differentiated products. In their view, a country that is lagging behind in technological development can be driven by free trade to specialize in labour-intensive goods and experience a decline in its long-term rate of growth.
VI. CONCLUSION
There were two main goals in preparing the present paper. The first was to demonstrate that the prediction of HOS that free trade brings about factor price equalization between developed countries and developing countries is at odds with the empirical findings about the link between trade and per capita economic growth.
The second was to claim that developed countries use free trade as a defensive strategy in order to dissociate Governments in developing countries/economies from markets. Based on the experience of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, developed countries/economies have good reason to believe that developing countries which have adopted ADM can manage to encroach on the market share of developed countries in desirable goods.
Free trade is not a neutral mechanism that, based on the HOS theorem, enriches countries by increasing the income of a country's abundant factor of production. While free trade creates a level playing field in the global market, it dissociates Governments in emerging economies from constructing their comparative advantage in high value added goods. In this sense, free trade has been used by developed countries in recent years as a defensive strategy for depriving developing countries of specializing in high value added goods. As more and more developing countries implement the orthodox economic model of neoliberalism advocated by IMF and developed countries, developing countries find it harder to escape the conventional division of labour assigned to them by the global market.
Finally, free trade does not lead to factor-price equalization between developed countries and developing countries as predicted by the HOS theorem. There are several forces that prevent this convergence from taking place. First, free trade has intensified competition among developing countries in the market for low value added goods. Second, globalization has created a race to the bottom among developing countries: which country can attract more FDI while repressing wages for labour? Third, globalization has increased the demand for female workers in developing countries, leading to the feminization of the labour market, which puts more downward pressure on wages for labour.
